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The original proposal for this study was made by war re-
serve managers at the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany,
Georgia. Their concern was with ways to better utilize the
war reserve assets of the Marine Corps. At that point a
study of war reserve procedures was begun, intentionally
avoiding extreme reliance on any single source or on current
practitioners in the field as a group. The intent was to per-
form a management analysis of the process, letting sound
principles of organization and common sense dictate the course
of that analysis and the nature of feasible alternatives to
be examined.
The question of how to better use war reserve resources
was formulated in three distinct components
:
(1) how to make better use of war reserve dollars received
in annual appropriations,
(2) how to make better use of the physical war reserve
assets attained with appropriation dollars,
(3) what alternatives to war reserves exist for accomplish-
ing the same purposes.
The intent of this thesis is to gain and present an under-
standing of the current system, examine problems, and offer




The basic source of information for analysis was a liter-
ature search described later in this chapter. After document-
ing the flow of responsibility and information relative to war
reserve management, an attempt was made to identify bottle-
necks and formulate a type of critical decision path leading
to asset attainment.
The key areas of item selection, requirements determina-
tion, replacement factors and budgeting were isolated for
further examination. While other studies have looked at
withdrawal, transport, and other aspects of physical handling
and management, the thrust of this effort was to recommend
changes to improve the efficiency with which the war reserve
block is identified and built.
Although Albany was mainly concerned with major end items
in supply class VII, all classes were surveyed, as were the
war reserve procedures of other services. New ideas are ex-
plained in enough detail to provide a fundamental understand-
ing and an appreciation of their potential to contribute to
the Marine Corps war reserve program.
The basic intent and constraints in this study were such
that the ultimate goal was arrows pointing to areas for fur-
ther study rather than final answers. A heavy reliance on
figures and flowcharts will be quickly perceived. Extracted
in some instances from the tables and text of other sources.
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or of original design, these figures are included to illus-
trate key points or clarify critical processes and flows.
The lack of such figures in Marine Corps orders and direc-
tives is seen as a hindrance to understanding the full spec-
trum of actions and interactions. In this regard, the clear,
concise description of current procedures was a goal in
itself.
C. ORDER OF PRESENTATION
Following this introduction. Chapter II will present an
overview of the current war reserve system which provides a
basis for detailed study of specific sectors.
Chapters III through VI examine key areas by describing
current procedures, highlighting problems, comparing methods
in use in other services, and discussing significant in-house
or contractor studies and recommendations.
Chapter VII addresses a variety of problems and alterna-
tives, including future implications of current decisions to
be made regarding new roles and missions for the Corps. The
final section of the study presents a brief summary and
specific conclusions and recommendations.
D. SOURCES OF INFORMATION




(1) Marine Corps orders and directives,
(2) studies by consultants,
(3) U.S. Army procedures and studies by the Concepts
Analysis Agency,
(4) telephone conversations with various offices at Head-
quarters Marine Corps and Albany, Georgia,
(5) General Accounting Office reports,
(6) earlier theses and articles.
As some of the sources, notably the consultant studies,
contained extensive literature surveys of their own, and as
the search capabilities of several DOD repositories were used
to screen possible sources, this study has considered a sig-
nificant portion of the work in the field.
The only significant problems encountered in this study
were related to information, and included (1) the classified
nature of many relevant sources, and (2) the wealth of new
developments, ideas and articles which have appeared in re-
cent months. The solution in the first instance was to
largely ignore classified information with the exception of a
small number of key studies which were reviewed. The section
in Chapter VII dealing with the future tries to capture the




E. MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MARINE CORPS
The introduction will conclude with an overview of the
missions, roles, and structure of the Marine Corps.
The mission of the Marine Corps is defined by statute as
follows: [1:651]
The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,
shall be so organized to include not less than three
combat divisions and three air wings, and such other
land combat, aviation, and other services as may be
organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized,
trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces
of combined arms, together with supporting air com-
ponents, for service with the fleet in seizure or
• defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of
such land operations as may be essential to the pros-
ecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine
Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for
service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide
security detachments for the protection of naval prop-
erty at naval stations and bases, and shall perform
such duties as the President may direct. However, these
additional duties may not detract from or interfere with
the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily
organized.
The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination
with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of am-
phibious operations that pertain to the tactics,
technique, and equipment used by landing forces.
The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with
joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peace-
time components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs
of war
.
A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
describes the Marine Corps as, "The United States' primary
long-distance, general-purpose force." [2:xi] Recent develop-
ments in Afghanistan and Iran, the formation of a joint Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) , maritime prepositioning of equipment
16

and supplies, and continuing questions of NATO vulnerability
prompted CBO to examine the viability of traditional missions
and the likely nature of future roles for the Corps. Change
in any form or continuance of the traditional missions in
today's world carries significant implications for war re-
serve needs and management.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps addressed these develop-
ments by stating: [3:1]
The recent invasion of Afghanistan and the potential
for further Soviet expansion in that part of the world
have prompted a thorough review of our nation's ability
to respond to challenges which threaten vital U.S. in-
terests overseas. Many new programs which will signif-
icantly enhance our capabilities to respond effectively
to deter aggression in remote regions of the world are
currently under development--more are being considered.
Since the Persian Gulf crisis erupted, there has
been an increased interest and growing recognition of
Marine Corps capabilities. Because of our readiness
and ability to deploy quickly to the scene of a crisis,
we can expect to assume an even greater role in the
defense of our nation in the years ahead. The major role
given to Marine forces assigned to the Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force (RDJTF) already affirms this.
The next few years will be a period of great chal-
lenge for the Corps . .
.
To perform its mission the Corps is organized into 185,200
active and 33,600 reserve personnel in three active divisions
with associated air wings, and one reserve division-wing team
(DWT)
. Each DWT has an associated Force Service Support Group
(FSSG) as well, to provide logistics augmentation and support.
Figures 1-1 through 1-3 illustrate the typical components of
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The Corps' formal structure links Division, Wing and FSSG
units into Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF) . Operationally,
Marine Corps doctrine takes an ad-hoc approach to meeting
requirements through task organization. Elements of a DWT
and FSSG are combined to form a task force commensurate with
the immediate mission. Figure 1-4 shows the major levels of
combined Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) and the typical
missions assigned to each. The capability of not only task
organizing, but tailoring and fine-tuning the task force
components is a fundamental principle of Marine Corps readiness
With a basic knowledge of the Corps' mission and structure.
Chapter II will address DOD and service war reserve policy, and




























































































































II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WAR RESERVE SYSTEM
This chapter will survey the war reserve system by
examining the who, what, where, and why underlying the
concept.
A. PURPOSE AND DEFINITION
As a part of logistics readiness, the Department of De-
fense (DOD) is responsible for maintaining sufficient assets
to meet surge demands for major military systems, supplies,
equipment, and component parts. This responsibility stems
from lessons learned during and after World War II which
dramatically emphasize that modern warfare is increasingly
less forgiving of the unprepared and will not tolerate a slow
build-up of resources. Additionally, new uncertainties and
contingencies place added premiums on flexibility and prompt-
ness of response.
The Marine Corns War Reserve Manual states: [4:1-3]
There is a continuing requirement to improve the
procedures for providing supply support for those
items of equipment which are combat essential. Since
Korea, the commitment of FMF ' s (Fleet Marine Forces)
has been characterized by a pattern of successive and
intermittent contingencies in which a state of war or
national emergency has not been declared. These actions
required the expanded use and deployment of the FMF's
for varying and uncertain periods of time. Invariably,
these actions require materiel support at a rate above
normal peacetime levels. To date, these extra levels of
effort have been supported by significant drawdowns of
normal peacetime operating levels, emergency supplemental




It is clearly evident that the policy of management
of mobilization requirements . . . requires modification
to provide for a level of stocks to be available to meet
emergency situations which will occur without a foirmal
declaration (of war) as well as those that may be es-
tablished by a presidential proclamation of national
emergency
.
Timely support is certainly not a new challenge for mili-
tary logistics. The purpose of a supply system has tradition-
ally been expressed as having the right item in the right
place at the right time, and in the proper amount. An equal-
ly well-worn phrase is the procuring and providing of beans,
bullets, and bandages.
Today, however, we live in an age of missiles, metascopes,
multimeters, and meal combat, individual. While the basic
mission remains the same, the policies and procedures, con-
cepts and constraints have changed as drastically as the items
of materiel involved. Truly global commitments, increased
equipment complexity, and prolonged leadtimes in producing,
procuring and positioning materiel add new dimensions and
dilemmas to support planning.
Thus, a convergence of pressures — internal and external,
old and new, operational and administrative — is focusing
attention on readiness and response. An important part of the
answer to this challenge is War Reserve Materiel (WRM)
.
War Reserves are formally defined by DOD as, "Stocks of
materiel amassed in peacetime to meet the increase in military
requirements consequent upon an outbreak of war. War reserves
24

are intended to provide the interim support essential to
sustain operations until resupply can be effected." [5:370]
This support mission, referred to as the "D to P concept,"
plugs the gap between D-day when operations commence and P-day
when production has adjusted to keep pace with mobilization
demand
.
While relatively simple in purpose, war reserve systems
are staggering in scope, encompassing the complete spectrum
of logistics functions from item selection to warehousing and
handling. War reserve programs must also be engineered and
executed within the broader context of rapid mobilization and
deployment to counter hostilities or perform vital contin-
gencies. Such tradeoffs as materiel versus mobility and hard-
ware versus holding cost complicate war reserve management
and compete for limited resources in the defense budget. What
decisions should be made is usually obvious. What decisions
can and must be made is never easy.
B. A TOP-DOWN EXAMINATION
The materiel heart of any war reserve system is the War
Materiel Requirement (WMR) . The WMR is inseparably bound to
and indeed driven by the ongoing intelligence estimates of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) . Various documents developed
within the framework of the JCS Joint Strategic Planning Sys-
tem (JSPS) provide (1) a military appraisal of threats to
the nation, (2) recommended military objectives to support
national policy, and (3) strategic proposals to attain and
25

sustain the interests of the United States. Estimates and
recommendations for required fiscal, manpower and materiel
resources are also included.
The Consolidated Guidance (CG) is an integral part of the
DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and
is issued to the military services by the Secretary of
Defense. The CG translates JSPS documents into specific
contingencies, force levels and planning constraints, also
considering the policies and politics of the current admin-
istration. Stated assumptions regarding such factors as the
reaction time to respond to a mobilization order or the sus-
tainability and intensity of combat can alter materiel
requirements as much or more than the scope or peculiarities
of a given mission assignment. Past guidance has specifically
authorized the separate military services to determine their
own best methods for calculating war reserve needs. This
authorization most likely stems from variances in readiness
requirements, size and nature of war reserve stocks and
specific mission and geographical assignments.
Following receipt of the CG, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps (CMC) develops Planning and Programming Guidance (PPG)
which prescribes materiel support objectives and serves as a
basis and authority for calculating war materiel requirements.
Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrate the war reserve concept,
utilizing approved definitions from the Department of Defense
26
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Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms to identify
specific materiel categories. Taken in toto, these various
groupings represent DOD's materiel needs to wage war.
War Materiel Requirements for the approved support per-
iod are calculated on an item by item basis for each major
operating unit. Separate formulas are used for computing
requirements for reparable items, consumable items, and end
items defined as follows:
(1) reparable item - an item which can be reconditioned
or economically repaired for reuse when it becomes un-
serviceable. [5:291]
(2) consumable (expandable) item - an item which is
consumed in use, such as ammunition, or which loses
its identity such as some repair parts, or which is
of low intrinsic value unworthy of full accounting
procedures. [5:130]
(3) end item - a final combination of end products /.u^^vXcc
component parts, and/or materials which is ready for
its intended use, e.g., ship, tank, mobile machine
shop, aircraft. [5:125]
"The WMR is offset by peacetime assets expected to be on-
hand on D-day and by the War Materiel Procurement Capability
(WMPC)
. These two elements are flexible in that they may
offset all, none, or a part of the WMR." [4:B-1]
The War Reserve Materiel Requirement (WRMR) for an item
represents that portion of the WMR which is not offset by
the Peacetime Force Materiel Requirement (PFMR) or the WMPC.
As shown, WRMR assets may be prepositioned with units of the




In analyzing the WMR it is essential to realize that
the several categories (1) contain the same types of items,
(2) are offsetting and dynamic, and (3) are inextricably
related. Nevertheless, each category is separately and, in
some cases, differently managed, and imbalances within or
between categories are common.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Management of war reserves can be described as a system
within a system, realizing that both DOD and the Marine Corps
provide detailed policy and procedures for daily supply op-
erations. An understanding of war reserves and the war re-
serve materiel pipeline requires an appreciation of the
organization for logistics and supply.
The Marine Corps supply system relative to war reserves
consists of three distinct functional areas, including (1)
Headquarters Marine Corps, (2) the Marine Corps Inventory
Control Point (ICP) , and (3) the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and
related retail supply organizations. Wholesale level in this
context includes assets and inventories which are controlled
by the ICP and are available for redistribution. Retail
organizations handle intermediate and/or consumer levels of
inventory located near the ultimate users. [6:2-2]
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has ultimate respon-
sibility for the total performance of the supply system and
the readiness of the service. In keeping with the concept
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of staff functioning, authority for the administration and
operational management of the war reserve program is delegated
to subordinate offices and activities. The Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plans and Operations (DC/S P&O) formulates war re-
serve program objectives in terms of force missions, troop
strength, and method and duration of employment. Acting
along with the Division of Requirements and Programs, DC/S
P&O publishes the annual war reserve guidance developed dur-
ing the PPBS cycle.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics
(DC/S I&L) is the Commandant's principal advisor on logistics
matters, and is responsible for plans and policies, materiel
program objectives, and materiel readiness. I&L is the ap-
propriations sponsor for Procurement Marine Corps (PMC) and
Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps (O&MMC) funds which
are used to acquire and support major items. Additionally,
this department oversees integrated logistics support plan-
ning and life cycle management of all major equipment. Pro-
curement, materiel standardization, equipment modification,
and requirements determination are I&L duties. This depart-
ment is the Marine Corps interface with other components,
services and agencies within DOD.
Relative to war reserves, I&L provides procedural guid-
ance and sets priorities for asset attainment. This depart-
ment provides input to the PPBS cycle for acquisition and
replenishment, and monitors and reports the status of the war
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reserve program in terms of requirements, attainments and
deficiencies. Annual guidance published by P&O is imple-
mented by I&L.
Other staff offices such as Aviation, Fiscal, Research
and Development, and Data Processing provide support within
their own areas of cognizance and expertise.
The wholesale activities within the supply system in-
clude those organizations, assets, and functions which are
controlled by the single Marine Corps ICP co-located with
the Logistics Base at Albany, Georgia. Specific responsibil-
ities of the ICP include: [7:1-9]
(1) Computation of materiel requirements





(7) War reserve management
(8) Technical direction of subordinate activities
The ICP is responsible for the day-to-day management of the
war reserve system, including providing technical assistance
to the FMF in requirements determination, and asset control,
positioning, rotation and issue. Marine Corps requirements
for war reserve stocks of commodities managed by other ser-
vices and agencies are computed and consolidated by the ICP
and registered with the appropriate manager. Subsequent
attainment actions and status are monitored at the ICP.
The Marine Corps Logistics Bases at Albany, Georgia and
at Barstow, California are the workhorse establishments of
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the system. Under the technical direction of the ICP, these
bases execute the broad functions of storage, maintenance,
care-in-storage, and physical distribution of materiel assets.
The third segment of the supply system is composed of the
FMF, including Division, Wing, and Force Service Support
Group (FSSG) units. The FSSG is a relatively new concept in
centralized combat service support which can function in
forward areas along with a full infantry division and air-
craft wing, or provide detachments to smaller amphibious
task forces. The FSSG serves as a link between the wholesale
activities and the using units, and performs the functions
normally associated with a retail supply activity. Among
other logistics support duties, the FSSG performs the total
range of inventory management functions. Relative to war
reserves, the FSSG maintains mount-out blocks of reserve
stocks in a protected status to support the associated FMF
task force. Maintenance, stock rotation, inspection and
replacement are the responsibility of the FSSG, subject to
close control from higher headquarters.
Each independent battalion, squadron or separate company
has an organic supply and maintenance capability which is
augmented by the FSSG. Because the General and Special Ac-
counts within the FSSG retain physical custody of war re-
serves until deployment, division and wing responsibility
is limited to developing logistics plans for assigned missions
and reviewing the adequacy of WRMRs generated by the ICP.
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Figure 2-3 is a recapitulation of the supply and war
reserve duties of each level of organization.
D. COMMODITY MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
While the full range and depth of supplies designated as
PWRMRs must be acquired and positioned within the Marine
Corps, significant OWRMR requirements are attained and held
by the Navy. This materiel is concentrated in several supply
classes as indicated in Figure 2-4, and mainly consists of
aviation-peculiar items, medical supplies, common items of
petroleum, oil and lubricants, and certain types of food
stores. For these classes and subclasses requirements are
estimated at the ICP and passed to the appropriate item
manager in the Navy.
E. ASSET POSITIONING
War reserve assets are positioned with using units, sup-
port units, retail supply activities, and at the wholesale
level. Common considerations in positioning materiel include:
(1) Response times for contingency operations,
(2) Shipping time,
(3) Transportation requirements and resources,
(4) Physical storage and maintenance requirements,
(5) Stock rotation opportunities.
After positioning, war reserve supplies can be categorized
as shown in Figure 2-5.
This chapter has presented the basic war reserve concept












•O 4J •H C u











^ •H 4J rH a* -P P
CO ^ (d (d fd 10 fd cn
0) a-P c cn -P CD (D P G
•H cn u cn +j cn U ^ cn fd
O +j Q) cu c t-\
w •H c cn 4J c cn cn fd P CO O4
en > H 0) jj X t3 4J 4J c (0 4J
M « s M CD Q) C ^ 0) u cnH w a c u <u 4J ^ cn
en en •H 0.4: fd cn e 04 C cn C a-H
H u ^ (d QJ -P a OS CD 0) •H c •H (U -P
J OS en -p u •H (U 2 ^ M fd -p u COM C e5 +» 5 ^ S •H e •H C •H CO
ffl OS (tj cu (d t3 eu S P TJ c -P P 73 CnOSH < .H cu c cn cr C ^ o •H G S
cn :s G. -P (d 0) r-i cn 0) fd c •H cn U fd rH «
z cn Q) 4J fd (U M fd -p &
o tfl (1) cn cn fd •H 4J cn p 04 fd cn cn
cu O. x: cn (U c ^ Id cn Q) 0) ia CD O4 cn
CO cn <d ^ •H +j rH -P U U^-H •» s >i Jh 5
§
rH cn •H P fO cn p •H P Id M cn 2 r-i P rH (D
(U O iH cn cn M P u £ cn u 4J Ti S O4 cn q; -H
> > X) +J (d T3 r-i Xi fd o cn c O4 fd > >
u (U •H 3 Q) OJ O c: J fd P cn 0) +j •H p cn P OJ (1) <u
> Q -P cw en s u M w u en M s en Q ^J fa c en S Q OS
OS o > QJ w •H
w • (U • • • • • w • • !T> • • • > • fd • • • •






OS E-t <: H









>^ E ctj •H fd Q i<j
iJ fO C rH c 2
Q* fd M < (X4
0^ >i ces 0) SD rH cn C -P 04 b
CO •Hp (d uH PC
ij P •H 3 -p Q) CO
<: CO -P o u ^ s 4J2 o Q) -p (U C G
o CO <u X 0. •H D^ pH o •m Q) 04 5 fd •HH w^ p c 4J Q) Q)
< •H 'd cn G fd Id u u u +J
CSJ > c e c c c fd UH ^ ^ rd cn •H •H cn Id fd +J
z O cn o -P fH e c c c c r-^ 0.
<: OU (D fi •H fd <U M cn (U o o Id &.
o P •H +J c •H <u C -H rH +J -p B cn-H p
OS CO o •H cn •H M -p •H -P c G Q) c u cn
o Sh •H 4J •H ^d 0) (1) 4J fd u •H •H cnH <u
tj TJ-H <d Cr» M +J TJ C u 4-> Id (d fd •p O4 >i
0* C O rH -P fd P 0) c: e s c C Ui r-i
a^ fO Q. S rH c S cn 04 c fd p O4D £ 0) u 4-> -P 'd rH g ^ 0.
en en ^ p T3 e -d c u c c •H cu u G P
<u cn CJ (U cn Q) (U Id r-i >i Q) fd JJ > >i u fd cn
+J C! M-l -P CP o -p s Id u s p Q) ^ fd
(d (d (d fd •H fd (U rH u 0) Q) Xi r-\ rH U
rH H 4J u c -p »H ^^ Id •H p u D^-H p >i fd •H
)« 3 a cn (U cn (d cn tP-H M c c p fd iH -p C rH M G
' 3 g U^ <D e •H P -p x: (U o M -p CU O4 Q) fd
U <-i (dT3 +J ^ p tr c u > cn 04 > O4 c cn
fd u P c (U o c CJ Q) Q) c 5h +J -H (U c p 0) U
&4 o CPPQ M rH J H OS U Eh H 04 en Q Q H en ej
CO o O
• •H ^ • • >1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • •








































Major end items - combinations
of products ready for their
intended use
Medical materiel*
Repair parts and components
including kits, assemblies
and subassemblies, reparables
and consummables required for
maintenance support
*Denotes classes and subclasses



































CATEGORIES OF PREPOSITIONED WAR RESERVES
PWRMR (USMC) PWRMR (USN)
MOUNT-OUT (MO) - That quantity of equipment and supplies re-
quired to sustain an FMF unit for the initial 30 days of com-
bat operations. All MAFs acquire and maintain mount-out.
MOUNT-OUT AUGMENTATION (MOA) - The second 30 day increment of
stock to support an FMF unit in combat operations. MOA is held
at the wholesale level for forces stationed in the U.S. while
III MAF in Okinawa, Japan is authorized to acquire and maintain
MOA due to distance and time factors.
AUTOMATIC RESUPPLY (AR) - The remaining war reserve assets held
in a protected status at the wholesale level to support FMF
combat operations. This term is a carry-over from earlier
periods when all reserves were configured into identical 30 day
blocks which were automatically "pushed" into forward areas on
an established schedule. Today, items are "pulled" out of the
war reserve system by requesting units. Though somewhat ana-
chronistic, the term is useful in distinguishing war reserve
assets held at the wholesale level.
LANDING FORCE OPERATIONAL RESERVE MATERIEL (LFORM) - Items
of PWRMS prepositioned aboard amphibious shipping, primarily




improved performance and potential savings should begin.
While tradeoffs can be made between cost, readiness, and
performance, the consequences of such actions must be made
explicit.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will examine item selection criteria,
requirements determination, and replacement factors, while




III. ITEM SELECTION CRITERIA; THE RANGE OF SUPPORT
The foundation of the war reserve system is the selec-
tion of those items which qualify for stockage. Readiness
and economy demand that the selection process accurately
identify required items while screening out non-essentials.
This chapter will critique current procedures and dis-
cuss the concept of combat essentiality.
A. CURRENT SELECTION CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES
Figures 3-1 and 3-2 display the criteria contained in the
Marine Corps War Reserve Policy Manual, arranged in a logical
screening sequence. Qualification for stockage is a two-
step process in which an item must satisfy one or more of the
positive criteria while not violating any negative or exclu-
sion criterion. Figure 3-2 notes that production and procure-
ment difficulties cannot qualify an item for stockage, but
should be weighed in applying the other criteria, and in re-
lated management decisions.
The screening process reflects standard DOD policy, and
would certainly appear to not only permit, but inevitably
result in varying interpretations and decisions. The cri-
teria are general in nature, relying heavily on the expe-
rience and judgment of the technician in determining combat
essentiality, relevant physical characteristics, and pro-
duction and procurement peculiarities.
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NEGATIVE SELECTION CRITERIA FOR WAR RESERVES
Is item required solely for
comfort, convenience, or morale?
n
Is item capable of being
easily fabricated in the
field with readily available
tools and material?
n
Is item non-essential for
the performance of combat,
combat support, or combat
service support missions?
n
Is item packaged operational rations?
n
Is item normally available in the
commercial market in sufficient
quantities to meet the time and
materiel requirements of the service?
n
Is item nonstandard, obsolete,
or due to be replaced?
n
Does item have a
shelf life constraint?
n





override other conditions? n
































POSITIVE SELECTION CRITERIA FOR WAR RESERVES
Is item essential for combat forces to destroy
the enemy or his capacity to wage war? T
I
"
Is item essential for battlefield
protection of combat forces? —
n
Is item essential for combat forces to detect,
locate and maintain surveillance of the enemy?"
n
Is item essential for combat forces to
maintain communications under war conditions?
n
Is item essential for operational
efficiency of combat support forces?
n
Is item essential for" sudden mobilization? —
n
Is item essential for survival or protection?
I
^
Is item considered operational rations?
n
*Is item subject to production difficulties,
i.e., long leadtimes, sole source, foreign
source, product of a military-industrial
activity or of such complexity as to require
constant inspection or surveillance?
n






























This criterion alone will not justify stockage, but




For Class VII items the Marine Corps Acquisition Project
Officer (APO) at Headquarters provides the ICP with critical
management and support information early in the provisioning
cycle. This information includes a measure of end item
essentiality. The provisioner, with the assistance of other
ICP and contractor personnel, assigns an appropriate code
reflecting item criticality and combat essentiality.
Criticality codes indicate, "Whether or not there exists
a critical, acute requirement for the item in its applica-
tion to the end item to function properly. " [8] Repair parts
for combat essential and non-combat essential end items may
be either critical or non-critical. Combat essentiality can
be described as follows: [9:65]
The basic factors that determine combat essentiality
... are urgency, compensability, and mission effective-
ness. Urgency suggests the infeasibility of postponing
a demand on the supply system . . . Compensability refers
to the ability to quick fix, substitute, cannibalize, or
locally manufacture . . . Finally the question is asked
whether mission effectiveness would be adversely effec-
ted by the failure of the item under consideration, and
if so, the item is designated as combat essential.
The ICP has recently combined combat essentiality and
criticality codes. Figure 3-3 shows the latest revision. Of
interest is the note that the code assigned for a new applica-
tion is compared with the existing code in the information
system, with the higher code being retained. Thus the single
code resident in the system for the entire support quantity




Non-Combat Essential End Item - End items that do not
fit the definition of Code 1 items
.
1 Combat Essential End Item - Items of equipment whose
availability in a combat ready condition is essential
for execution of the combat and training mission of
the command.
2 Non-Critical Repair Part - Repair parts or major com-
ponents whose failure in an end item will not render
the end item inoperative or reduce its effectiveness
below the minimum acceptable level of efficiency, and
which do not fit the definition of Code 3 or 4 items.
3 Critical for Health and Safety of Personnel - Those
parts and components that are required for the health
and safety of personnel, and which do not fit the
definition of Code 5 or 6 items.
4 Critical for State and Local Laws - Those parts and
components which are required for conformance to
state law or local ordinances, and which do not fit
the definition of Code 5 or 6 items.
5 Critical Repair Part to a Combat Essential End Item -
Those parts or components whose failure in a combat
essential end item will render the end item inopera-
tive or reduce its effectiveness below the minimum
acceptable level of efficiency.
6 Critical Repair Part to a Non-Combat Essential End
Item - Those parts or components whose failure in a
non-combat essential end item will render the end
item inoperative or reduce its effectiveness below
the minimum acceptable level of efficiency.
NOTE: A comparison of the code for an NSN (National Stock
Item) is made for each higher order equipment application
within the Marine Corps supply system. The code actually





B. EVALUATION OF CURRENT ITEM SELECTION PROCEDURES
The criteria presently in use do not differ significantly
from those discussed by the Logistics Management Institute
(LMI) in a comprehensive study of DOD war reserves. LMI
criticism included: [10:22-23]
(1) The criteria are general in nature and subject
to the judgments of the military services and individual
commanders.
(2) The criteria do not link selection of an item
for war reserve stockage to a specific need in a specif-
ic assigned contingency.
(3) The current criteria do not address conditions
which are likely to prevail during the initial combat
period. Handling, storage, transport and repair con-
straints may eliminate candidate items which appear to
otherwise qualify.
(4) Many of the criteria refer to a measure of
item essentiality which simply has not been quantified.
Despite these shortcomings, LMI concludes that: [10:80-81]
The war reserve selection criteria . . . cannot be
significantly improved by more definitive criteria
of a qualitative nature . . . The most significant
improvements . . . can be achieved by establishing
uniform policies and consistent methods for comput-
ing war reserve requirements.
GAO studies have commented on the lack of specificity in
the annual Secretary of Defense guidance and the overuse and
abuse of high criticality codes as causes of waste and in-
efficiency. Commenting on the Air Force, they stated, "All
five of the Air Logistics Centers have at least 81% of the
items they manage identified as highly critical." [ll:ii]
The next section will examine the elusive and ill-
defined concept of item essentiality.
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C. THE CONCEPT OF ITEM ESSENTIALITY
Determining essentiality involves analyzing an item with
respect to its contribution to the success of a mission.
Such an analysis must consider the operating environment,
nature of the mission, extent of degradation in ability to
perform if an item is lost, and the way in which the item
interfaces with other items and equipment. An adequate
treatment of these factors demands the same judgment and
effort as is devoted to operating plans, task organizations,
and tailored troop and equipment lists. Though inherently
and unavoidably subjective, this process needs a common
method and yardstick for applying it.
Essentiality depends not only on the mission but also
on the organizational unit. Although a jeep or rifle is
conceivably essential for any unit, under normal circum-
stances they would be less critical in a Supply Battalion
than in the command element of an infantry unit. Essential-
ity is also a function of the number and status of similar
items within the unit. The marginal effect of losing one
truck is probably greater in an Artillery Battalion than in
a Motor Transport Battalion.
GAO found that essentiality decisions in the Air Force
were often made by individuals who were unfamiliar with the
combat employment or importance of the item being procured.
[ll:iii] In this situation the normal reaction is to assign
a code which will permit stockage. As noted in Figure 3-3,
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such an improper coding in the Marine Corps would likely be
recorded against and applied to all applications of the same
item. Managers who calculate requirements are instructed to
do so on an unconstrained basis, regardless of budget pro-
jections. Thus, an initially well-intended but ill-founded
stockage qualification decision is compounded, and the indi-
vidual or office tasked with prioritizing spending and asset
attainment is truly confounded. It is indeed very easy to
imagine a scenario where unnecessary items are procured
while valid requirements go unfunded.
Figure 3-4 is a sample of the mission and task portions
of an official Marine Corps Table of Organization. While
more elaborate means of identifying and coping with the
concept of essentiality are available, the T/0 could be used
to classify the importance of a unit's equipment relative to
its assigned missions. Basing essentiality coding on rep-
resentative missions of similar units may be a workable
compromise to dealing with all the possible contingencies
which face individual units. The concept of essentiality
is further explored in Chapter VI , where spending priorities
are discussed.
Given time, unlimited resources and adequate transporta-
tion, America's industrial base could probably overcome poor
planning much as industrial might has decided major wars in
the past. Today, however, all three commodities are
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SAMPLE MISSION AND TASK STATEMENT
OF A MARINE WING SUPPORT GROUP
3. MISSION AND TASKS
a. Mission . Provide coihmand, control, supply and
logistics support for the squadrons of the group; motor
transport support both medium and heavy, refueling support
for both ground equipment and aircraft; engineer support and
organizational maintenance (motor transport and engineer)
for elements of the Marine Aircraft Wing.
b. Tasks
heavy)
(1) Provide motor transport support (medium and
(2) Provide engineer equipment support.
(3) Provide materiel handling support.
(4) Provide refueling support for ground equipment
and aircraft.
(5) Provide Tactical Airfield Dispensing Systems as
required for MAW units.
(6) Provide camp construction and facilities main-
tenance for MAW.
(7) Provide organizational maintenance for motor
transport and engineer equipment of MAW units.
(8) Provide mobile electric power for the MAW.
(9) Provide essential water and hygiene support in
the area of portable water, bath facilities and laundry
facilities for the MAW.
(10) Locate quarries, sand and gravel pits, and
other sources of construction material in the objective area,
(11) Provide expedient/minor repair of existing air-
fields, runways/taxi ways.
(12) Conduct second echelon level maintenance of all
organic engineer equipment.




stretched and strained, and a workable concept of essential-




IV. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION; THE DEPTH OF SUPPORT
Requirements determination is an inseparable building-
block companion to item selection. As before, accuracy,
thoroughness and consistency are required to prevent waste
or want.
This chapter will survey requirements determination
methods for all classes of supply and types of items in
hopes that variations in management procedures between dif-
ferent groupings may suggest solutions to problems in any
single area.
A. CLASS I REQUIREMENTS
War materiel requirements for subsistence items would
seem to be a simple function of the number of men involved
in an assigned contingency and the number of days projected
for either the combat operation or the establishment of a
resupply pipeline. A dominant physical and policy considera-
tion, however, is the three year shelf life of packaged
operational rations. As a result, stock levels must not
exceed quantities which can be rotated and consumed in nor-
mal peacetime training during the shelf life period.
As prescribed, a WMR is calculated for subsistence and
offset by peacetime stocks on hand. The remainder represents
the WRMR and is passed for planning purposes to the Defense
Personnel Support Center of the Defense Logistics Agency.
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Curiously, the ration supplement, sundries pack is not
stocked during peacetime. Requirements for this item are
registered directly with a civilian contractor. [4:2-3]
B. CLASS III REQUIREMENTS
The Marine Corps' primary source for common petroleum,
oil, and lubricant (POL) items is the U.S. Navy. Require-
ments are centrally computed at Headquarters Marine Corps
based on equipment densities and planning factors developed
from historical usage data. This information is forwarded
to the Navy. Quantities required for the first sixty days
of combat are classified as PWRS while the remainder is
registered as OWRS.
A certain portion of the PWRS is further designated as
Landing Force Operational Reserve Materiel (LFORM) and pre-
positioned aboard amphibious assault shipping. War reserve
stocks must also be classified as bulk or packaged POL to
ensure that the products are received in a form which is
compatible with the user's materiel handling capabilities.
Suggested planning factors for Marine Corps-peculiar
oils, greases and lubricants are listed in the Table of
Authorized Materiel (TAM) for each item of equipment. These
factors are used by major force commanders along with equip-
ment allowances to determine requirements. Mount-out levels
of stock for sixty days are attained and held as PWRS at
the retail supply level. The remaining WRMR is passed to
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the ICP, procured, and positioned at the wholesale level.
This bottom-up calculation of requirements for peculiar
items enables and encourages commanders to use their own
judgment. The TAM invites, and indeed instructs that such
factors as mission, environment, objective area and task
organization be considered in deviating from listed con-
sumption rates. While such factors equally effect consump-
tion of common POL items, the variation relative to the ab-
solute size of the requirement is small enough to permit
centralized computation.
C. CLASS V REQUIREMENTS
Headquarters calculates the WMR for ground ammunition
based on the approved force structure, weapons mix, and
combat expenditure rates. [4:2-7] Force commanders review
these calculations in light of their own specific assign-
ments, recommending quantity changes and distribution be-
tween MO, MOA, AR, and LFORM. As a result of amphibious
shipping shortfalls it is frequently necessary to pre-
position ammunition in forward areas with other services or
allies. An initial sixty-day support requirement is planned
for and positioned before any consideration of the WMPC.
Following the WMPC offset, the remaining WMR is like-
wise designated as PWRS . This stock is attained and con-
trolled by Headquarters but normally stored at arsenals and
ammunition depots of other services.
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D. CLASS IX REQUIREMENTS
Repair parts and components required for maintenance
support are divided into several categories, each with its
own requirements determination procedure. These categories
include consumable parts, reparables , critical low-density
insurance items, and shelf life items.
Requirements for consumable repair parts are calculated
at the ICP based on assigned replacement factors. These
factors are derived from actual usage data or recommended by
equipment manufacturers and specialists during the provision-
ing of a new item. As these factors represent peacetime
conditions, a combat replacement factor of 1.75 is multiplied
by the assigned replacement factor to determine WRMRs.
[6:111-7] That portion of the WRMR designated as MO or MOA
is positioned at the appropriate retail or wholesale level
activity. Figure 4-1 illustrates the calculation of all
three PWRS increments for consumable repair parts.
Calculations for reparable items differ slightly for
using units, support units, or wholesale supply activities
depending on the exact type and purpose of the inventory.
Figure 4-2 is included to show the kinds of considerations
which come into play in a typical calculation. Reparable
parts are managed in a special account of the FSSG known as
the Maintenance Float. The float coordinates repair of
unserviceable items with the appropriate maintenance activ-
ity and maintains an inventory of reparables to support
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MO, MOA, AND AR COMPUTATIONS FOR CONSUMABLE ITEMS
A = Annual Replacement Factor (1.75 x assigned re-
placement factor)
B = Applications per end item - the number of times
a repair part is installed in an end item
C = End item density - how many of a particular end
item are held by a given unit/task organization
MO = AXBXCX tI^
MOA = AXBXCX ^^360
120AR = AXBXCX 360
NOTE: This sample calculation assumes a standard




MO, MOA, AND AR COMPUTATIONS FOR REPARABLE ITEMS
MAINTENANCE FAILURE RATE - The annual rate of replacement
of an unserviceable item. When more reliable engineering
or maintenance data are not available, the replacement fac-
tor of every independent repair part and assembly compris-
ing the reparable item are totaled to determine the MFR of
the reparable.
REPAIR RATE - The fractional quantity of MFR anticipated to
be repaired each month. Maintenance and repair data reported
by the FMF for the same or similar items are considered in
determining the RR. In the event that empirical maintenance
and repair data are not available, data provided by main-
tenance engineering analysis reports or engineering data
obtained from the provisioning list and engineering staff
of the contractor are considered. In the absence of empirical
data a standard 90% RR is applied.
REPAIR CYCLE TIME - The total elapsed time from removal of the
reparable item that has failed until the return of the item to
the maintenance float in a serviceable condition. This time
includes removal, in-transit, under inspection, awaiting parts,
under repair, and other stages.
RESUPPLY RATE - The fractional quantity of MFR anticipated to
be "washed out" each month and to require replacement by
requisitioning from the normal source of supply. The RSR is
the MFR less the RR quantity. In the absence of any data a
standard 10% RSR is applied.
DAY LEVEL AUTHORIZED - The number of days of supply authorized.
Maintenance Float accounts are presently authorized 30 days in
the United States and 60 days overseas.
MO = (RR QTY X ^) + (RSR QTY X ^)
MOA = RSR QTY




using units in a direct-exchange fashion.
Present policy provides for deviating from the standard
formulas to ensure minimum stockage of critical low-density
items. When a thirty-day usage level fails to authorize at
least a quantity of 1 for such items, 180 and 360 day levels
are calculated. If a requirement is still not indicated,
one item is authorized for stock. Critical items are spe-
cifically designated as such by Headquarters.
E. CLASS II, IV, AND VII REQUIREMENTS
These classes are discussed as a group because of their
identifical treatment in the TAM. Within the TAM, items in
these classes are categorized as follows:
(1) Type 1 - items which appear in a unit's official
table of equipment (T/E) and which are considered manda-
tory allowances to be kept on-hand or on-order at all
times. Type 1 items are normally funded by Headquarters.
(2) Type 2_ - items of materiel for which the T/E allow-
ance is considered a guide. Specific mandatory allowances
are determined by the force commander and items are funded
at the local level.
(3) Type 3^ ~ special purpose equipment such as arctic
and desert environmental items and field fortification
materiel. These supplies are not authorized for procure-
ment and are maintained and issued out of central training
allowance pools during peacetime.
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The type designation in the TAM and the class of supply
significantly effect how an item is managed and how war
reserve levels are calculated.
Type 1^ items are considered essential for combat opera-
tions. Authorization to compute and acquire war reserve
stock is indicated in the TAM by the assignment of a Combat
Active Replacement Factor (CARF) . "The CARE reflects usage
incident to amphibious operations and other combat opera-
tions normal to the FMF and is a representation expressed in
monthly increments of the combat life expectancy of the
equipment . " [12: XX] A second class of war reserve TAM items
consists of entries with a Combat Support Stock Requirement
(CSS RQ) . Items having a CSS RQ are identified with a Y.
Force commanders are responsible for determining and procur-
ing MO levels of class II type 1^ equipment in these categories
Follow-on PWRS for class II type 1 and all levels of class
VII type
_1 are calculated and managed by the ICP. Figure 4-3
is a sample page from the TAM showing CARF and CSS RQ items
.
Type II items in classes II, IV, and VII which qualify
for war reserve stockage are also indicated by assignment of
a CARF or CSS RQ. As with type 1 items, force commanders
compute and attain MO allowances for classes II and IV,
while the ICP controls MOA, AR, and all levels of class VII.
War reserve requirements for type 3_ items with a CARF
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II and IV are reviewed by the force commanders, who recom-
mend quantities to be positioned within the FMF. Remaining
quantities are held at the wholesale level. All class VII
assets are managed by the ICP.
This overview of the requirements determination process
for each class clearly shows that a variety of different
methods does exist, reflecting special circumstances and
constraints. Attempts to improve performance in one area
should logically look at other areas for feasible alternatives
Some key across-the-board assumptions such as the use of a
1.75 acceleration figure for combat factoring of consumables,
deserve closer analysis. Additionally, initial allowances
which in combination with replacement factors drive WRMR
calculations, deserve attention, but are beyond the scope
of this study.
Chapter V will further address the requirements deter-




A. THE HISTORICAL USE OF REPLACEMENT FACTORS
The requirements determination process is driven to a
large degree by initial unit allowances and replacement
factors. Stanford Research Institute (SRI) states, "The
Marine Corps has used combat active replacement factors
(CARFs) for years as a mathematical tool for determining
requirements for supplies and equipment to replace antic-
ipated losses in combat." [13:1]
Initially, CARFs were used by FMF units to compute ready-
for-deployment stocks to be held as mount-out, and by the
ICP to calculate replenishment quantities.
Over the years there has been a gradual centraliza-
tion of the process for determining WMR, including the
central computation of mount-out requirements; HQMC
and the Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) at Albany,
Georgia have assumed the major roles. As a consequence,
the FMFs are now less directly involved with CARFs and
are more concerned with the review of centrally com-
puted requirement quantities for their specific mis-
sions, operational requirements and contingencies. [13:7]
A Replacement Factor Review Board was established at
Headquarters in 1962 to approve initial assignments and per-
iodically review planning factors. The board's primary con-
cerns were in identifying equipment which would likely be
used in combat, and in estimating attrition.
No significant changes in the process took place until
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deletion of many CARFs. Looking for the first time at such
factors as combat essentiality, alternate weapons and tac-
tics, commercial availability and item density within likely
task organizations, the board adjusted factors and decreased
the overall WMR by nearly one billion dollars. [13:8]
In the late seventies weaknesses in the CARF system, in-
cluding the absence of CARFs for many items, again focused
attention on the process. Several expedient adjustments were
made to shore-up readily perceived shortcomings, and a study
was contracted to develop a new methodology and determine
new CARFs. These recent actions, as well as current pro-
cedures, are discussed in the following sections.
B. THE CURRENT CARF PROCEDURE
Figure 5-1 depicts the current Marine Corps procedure for
assigning and approving CARFs. Acquisition Project Officers
(APOs) within the commodity branches of the Materiel Division
formulate recommendations for initial assignments or changes.
The basis for such recommendations includes a broad assess-
ment of the component and system in question, their pecu-
liarities, and their physical and performance characteristics
Documentation from previous and on-going research and devel-
opment is considered, along with the factors assigned to
similar systems and/or by other services. The collection,
careful analysis and integration of this data are heavily
dependent on the experience and expertise of the APO.
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Additionally, the fiscal condition of the project may cause
the APO to identify initial attainment quantities of materiel
which are less than the full support requirement. While such
a condition is unfortunate, the possible alternative of "low-
balling" a CARF to match apparent requirements with available
funds could prove disastrous. Though a primary proponent of
his assigned system, the APO is graded on timely acquisitions
within allotted budgets, and not on long term effectiveness.
The APO's recommendation is staffed through various
divisions and departments at Headquarters and passed with
comments to the Replacement Factor Review Board. SRI points
out that Headquarters reorganizations in the mid-1970 's un-
dermined the traditional membership and chairmanship of this
board. Reestablished in 1977, the board has formalized pro-
cedures and borrowed heavily from the U.S. Army wartime re-
placement factor system (WARFs) . WARFs are derived from a
combination of war gaming, attrition modeling, and historical
usage data. Nevertheless, two primary factors have signif-
icantly hampered the board: (1) the absence of a clear audit
trail reflecting the rationale behind previously assigned
CARFs, and (2) a lack of quantitative methods, making the
board heavily dependent on experience and subjective judge-
ment.
Following approval by DC/S I&L, CARFs are input into
the Item Data File (IDF) of the Logistics Management Informa-
tion System (LMIS) . Once updated, IDF information is passed
62

to various users in the TAM, tailored file extracts, or in
complete file copies.
While the resurgence of interest in CARFs bodes well for
the future, it has created several imbalances and inconsis-
tencies in the present. During the Program Objective Memo-
randum (POM) phase of the 1980 budget process a transition
from one to four rates per item was begun. This project is
grounded in the realization that different types of threats
in different geographic locations certainly mean different
attrition rates and operational demands on equipment. The
four factors include: [13:9]
(1) Europe Intense - factor applied to determine
requirements for units committed to the European the-
ater during a period when intense combat is antic-
ipated.
(2) Europe Sustained - factor applied to deter-
mine requirements for units committed to the European
theater during periods of other than intense combat.
(3) World-wide Intense - factor applied to deter-
mine requirements for units committed outside of
Europe during a period when intense combat is
anticipated.
(4) World-wide Sustained - factor applied to de-
termine requirements for units committed outside of
Europe during periods of other than intense combat.
Converting to the four-rate approach in an orderly fashion
requires data which is simply not available. Faced with this
predicament, the Marine Corps substituted NATO Intense and
NATO Sustained WARFs for the European theater, while scaling
down these same figures to arrive at world-wide factors.
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For items lacking analogous Army rates, the following scheme
was used: [13:10]
(1) Europe Intense = 2 x Old CARF
(2) Europe Sustained = 3/4 x Old CARF
(3) World-wide Intense = 1 x Old CARF
(4) World-wide Sustained = 2/3 x Old CARF
The troublesome, if temporary result of these machinations is
an IDF with four factors which interfaces with a TAM and sev-
eral logistics models geared to deal with a single CARF.
C. EVALUATION OF CARF PROCEDURES
The preceding overview of current CARF procedures clearly
shows the impetus for and importance of the SRI study. An
interim report issued in February of 1980 highlights the
following points: [13:3-4]
(1) The current USMC methodology for determining
CARFs is inadequate. It is largely based on judgmen-
tal criteria, with some degree of reliance on the Army.
Traditionally it has not enjoyed a scientific basis
for decision making. In addition, it does not capture
and save loss data generated from the fragmented sources
of studies, field exercises, peacetime usage, and combat
history.
(2) There is a need to differentiate between com-
bat active attrition rates (CAARs) and CARFs. Combat
active attrition rates reflect that amount of materiel
which the USMC can anticipate losing in combat. Com-
bat active replacement factors indicate that amount of
materiel which will be replaced in combat. CARFs may
be subject to practical considerations concerning
actual replacement in combat.
(3) The only service with a quantitative methodol-
ogy for determining losses is the Army, but its direct
applicability to the USMC is limited. ... The asso-




(4) There is no universally accepted methodol-
ogy for modeling attrition in combined arms combat.
Moreover, none is foreseeable. No one methodology
has enough scope and breadth to detail all attrition
processes and sources.
(5) Attrition models must be augmented by addi-
tional research tools. In order to support the
decision process, simulations, field exercises,
study results and history must be combined with
sound military judgment and experience.
Despite the inherent difficulties in developing and im-
plementing an adequate CARF system, the value of the effort
is beyond reproach. Similar to the LMI conclusion regard-
ing item selection, uniform application of a procedure for
determining replacement factors is of greater importance
than the technical accuracy of the selected procedure.
With initial allowances, a requirements determination
process, and replacement factors, planners can estimate
needs. The next step in war reserve management is to estab-
lish budget and spending priorities to attain the assets
to meet these needs.
Section D provides additional information on the U.S.
Army WARF process.
D. THE U.S. ARMY WARF PROCEDURES
The Army's wartime replacement factor (WARF) procedures
are used to develop consumption rates for major combat items
in a European, nonnuclear combat scenario. Loss and con-
sumption rates have traditionally been derived from actual
historical data. Resultant factors unavoidably reflect past
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experience and are of questionable value when applied to new
equipment, technology, tactics, and combat situations. In
1964 the Army began work on SYMWAR - a System for Estimating
Materiel Wartime Attrition and Replacement Requirements.
While the latest SYMWAR methodology reflects changing intel-
ligence estimates and an expanding simulation and war-gaming
capability, the basic concept has not changed.
SYMWAR is an interactive matrix system which considers
three conditions, including (1) 10 causes of loss, (2) 4
combat postures of the force, and (3) 5 location zones rel-
ative to the area of frontline operations identified by the
Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) . Figure 5-2 lists
these conditions and elements, while Figure 5-3 displays a
SYMWAR loss matrix. A separate matrix is generated for each
of 36 classes of combat items grouped as a result of similar
design, operating, repair, and vulnerability characteristics,
Each class is represented in the actual computation of WARFs
by a notional item which typifies the class. Figure 5-4 is
a listing of the classes currently in use.
The original SYMWAR model was heavily dependent on his-
torical data from World War II and Korea. Under WARF, the
cells identified by dashes in Figure 5-3 are calculated by
simulation and gaming as changes in the weaponry, mobility,
target acquisition capability and tactics have undermined
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1. Strike Airplane 19
2. Surveillance Airplane 20
3. Utility Airplane 21
4. Airplane Subsystem 22
5. Strike Helicopter 23
6. Surveillance Helicopter 24,
7. Utility Helicopter 25
8. Helicopter Subsystem 26
9. Missile 27
10. Howitzer, Self-Propelled 28
11. Howitzer, Towed 29
12. Gun, (20mm and above)
,
SP 30
13. Gun, {20mm and above). Towed 31
14. Tank 32
15. Carrier, Mortar, SP 33
16. Mortar 34
17. Machine Gun 35
18. Recoilless Rifle 36
Individual Weapon
Armored Personnel Carrier
Truck (less than 2.5 ton)



















cells the two basic sources of loss data are the Concepts
Evaluation Model (CEM) and the Ammo Rates Artillery Models.
The CEM is used to estimate consumption for those items
of equipment which experience a significant portion of loss
due to direct fire where the target can be seen and is a
point of aim. Fully automated, the CEM simulation considers:
[14:3-4]
(1) Weapon system and personnel losses
(2) Force mix
(3) Logistics and resupply
(4) Personnel replacement and evacuation




(9) Massing ^ against penetrations
For items not normally subject to direct fire, indirect
(area) fire losses are computed using various artillery
models from the Ammo Rates Methodology. These models utilize
vulnerability classes and notional items as shown in Figure
5-5 to estimate consumption.
Historical and simulation data from the Concepts Evalua-
tion and Artillery Models are combined with data from a ship-
ping loss model and other sources in a bookkeeping model
roll-up process. The WARF factor which results is, "The
average daily non-repairable loss rate expressed as a percent




Number of items lost per period
Duration of period X average
authorized item strength of
units in the theater
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WARF ARTILLERY MODEL VULNERABILITY CLASSES
Vulnerability
Class Title Notional Item
1 Light aircraft Helicopter, light
observation
2 Light armor Carrier, armored personnel
3 Medium/heavy armor Combat tanks
4 Light vehicles Truck, 1/4 ton
5 Medium/heavy self-
propelled vehicles
Truck, 2 1/2 ton
6 Light boats Bridge erection boats
7 Light towed equip-
ment
Trailer, cargo, 1/4 ton











12 Ammo transporters Carrier, cargo, 6 ton
13 POL transporters Truck, tank, fuel servic-
ing
14 Small arms Rifle, 5.56mm
15 Crew- served weapons Machinegun, 7.6 2mm






18 Machines Generator set, 5-10 KW
19 Small equipment Antenna, RC292
20 Shop sets Shop equipment, mechanics
21 POL storage Fuel system, 6,000 gallon




VI. BUDGETING AND ASSET ATTAINMENT
Budgeting and procurement roles closely parallel respon-
sibilities for determining requirements. Thus, despite re-
cent trends towards centralized management, asset attainment
requires action by HQMC, the logistics bases, retail supply
outlets, and in some cases by the operating units themselves.
Fiscal constraints preclude attaining the full range of
WRM. Presupposing the availability of adequate funds, real-
istic asset attainment goals must still consider the problems
of limited shelf life, changes to contingencies and allow-
ances, and equipment design obsolescence.
Presently, the annual planning and programming guidance
issued by Headquarters considers asset deficiencies and
fiscal constraints in prescribing attainment priorities for
subordinate units. Unfortunately, these priorities are
expressed in terms of specific contingency missions, failing
to provide consistent or comprehensive guidance for making
item-by-item tradeoffs.
While it is important to preserve and protect the com-
mander's freedom to tailor a WRM package, the efficient
allocation of limited resources demands some system for set-
ting attainment priorities. This chapter will further exam-
ine and critique current procedures, and describe a simple
framework for allocating resources.
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A. CURRENT WAR RESERVE BUDGETING PROCEDURES
The principal document used in war reserve budgeting is
the Item Readiness Study Report (P20A) . This report isolates
deficiencies and develops the official Marine Corps inventory
objective for principal items.
The P20A is extracted from various files within the Logis-
tics Management Information System (LMIS) at Headquarters, in-
cluding the item data file, equipment allowance file, troop
list file, and Procurement Marine Corps file. As shown in
Figure 6-1 the first column of the report lists requirements
for major active and reserve forces, mobilization training,
operational projects and supply operations. Allowance and
authorized inventory quantities are listed along with a sub-
total in the next four columns. Post D-day consumption,
estimated from CARFs, is reflected in six thirty-day incre-
ments and also subtotaled.
Initial issue and post D-day consumption are added to
yield an object total for each item. As shown, this figure
is offset by an estimate of the post D-day production capa-
bility and reduced to a net total. The final adjustment,
listed as a "less no buy" quantity, most likely reflects a
conglomeration of off-line management considerations includ-
ing design obsolescence, contingency priorities, and actual
or anticipated budget ceilings.
Item Readiness Study Reports and other data from the LMIS











































































































































































Report, illustrated in Figure 6-2. This report is used to
present the Marine Corps budget request to the Department of
the Navy and DOD. As can be seen, requirements are consol-
idated into line entries so that visibility of war reserve
related deficiencies and decisions is lost. This condition
is further exacerbated when budget requests are formulated
into the appropriations structure and language required by
Congress.
The system described above has several apparent weakness-
es. Although the framework for decision making appears sound,
the fabric is suspect. As the Marine Corps buys most of its
equipment from other DOD integrated materiel managers (IMM)
it is unclear where post D-day production figures are obtained
Additionally there are no IMM provisions for giving priority
to any single customer, regardless of previously recorded
requirements. As will be discussed in later chapters, the
DOD Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP) program is fraught
with massive problems of its own.
The "less no buy" adjustment is simplistically displayed
and does not summarize or shed any light on the rationale
behind the adjustment decision. An appreciation and under-
standing of the resulting inventory objective requires such
detail and specificity.
Finally, the bureaucratic bargaining process which tailors
budget requests and final appropriations lacks the information
to assess the impact of tradeoff decisions. Bargaining in
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the blind at the appropriation level can undermine even the
most logical and lucid budget request.
B. A FRAMEWORK FOR SETTING ATTAINMENT PRIORITIES
In 1956 an article in Operations Research stated: [15:431]
The Military Services make much use of supply tables
... which have the following characteristics:
1. They consist of a bundle of spare parts which
have been selected in advance to meet the supply needs
of vehicles, aircraft, ships, etc., as the case may be,
to the maximum extent possible.
2. The table is the sole source of supply during
the period that it is in use.
3. There is one factor that limits the size of these
tables, etc. In the case of a flyaway kit, this may be
weight; in the case of a supply table, this may be money;
and in the case of an allowance list, this may be volume.
In any case, there is always some limitation to how large
the table can be.
In contract work for the Marine Corps, SRI has developed
algorithms for constructing tables of supply limited by
budget resources, weight, volume, and the number of man-hours
required to pull items from inventory and prepare them for
shipment. The objective in each instance was to determine the
number of units of each item which should be stocked in order
to minimize shortages and stay within the operative constraint.
An obvious refinement suggested but not yet used is to
weight the probability of a shortage by the combat essentiality
of the particular item. A measure of essentiality is needed
to cope with the major considerations when faced with a limited
budget, including (1) what items must the unit have to func-
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tion at a minimum acceptable level, and (2) what additional
items should be funded if funding is available.
Combat essentiality is a difficult concept to measure
and to treat mathematically. The effects of synergy and
saturation suggest that as the total number of units of an
item changes, the utility derived from each additional unit
also varies. Interactions among items exist so that a short-
age of one may affect the utility of a related item, i.e.,
jeeps and trailers. Nevertheless, practicality demands that
a procedure for processing large tables of supply be mech-
anized and as straightforward as possible.
Figure 6-3 illustrates a process to assign priorities
for attainment based on a measure of essentiality. This study
previously discussed relating individual items to the mission
which they support and assigning an essentiality measure based
on whether that mission is primary, secondary, or tertiary
to the organization. In similar manner, SRI identifies and
describes 22 basic missions which a Marine Corps unit may
perform, and uses the following scheme to assign weights: [16]
MISSION DESCRIPTIVE PRIORITY NUMERICAL WEIGHT
Primary High priority 8
Secondary Medium priority 4
Tertiary Low priority 2
Other Non-priority 1
Figure 6-4 lists the missions isolated by SRI, while Figure
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Funding prioritization begins with requirements deter-
mination. If the CARFs and LMIS data are accurate, the net
total figure in the P20A report less assets already held
equals deficiencies. Returning to Figure 6-3 a sort pro-
cedure groups items requiring similar management.
Skeleton Tables of Equipment (T/E) is the name applied
to that class of items without which a unit cannot perform
its basic missions. Deficiencies in items identified in this
class receive top priority in allocation and can be auto-
matically funded if the budget permits. Funding shortages
encountered at this point indicate a strong need to reprogram
funds from other areas or seek a supplemental appropriation.
The next two classes of items are special and/or sensitive
materiel and high-dollar equipment. While no definitions or
thresholds are suggested for these classes, it is obvious that
such things as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
equipment, or multi-million dollar aircraft are not compatible
with machine management or a simple logic routine. Manual
estimation of attainment quantities in these classes permits
consideration of a wide range of special management factors.
Finally, the remainder of the deficiencies can be ranked
by weighted essentiality/utility and funded until the appro-
priation is exhausted. If the resulting block appears unsat-
isfactory in any manner, a revised table can be constructed
by re-entering the process after filling of the skeleton T/Es.
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Though simplistic, such a plan would be a worthy first
step towards consistency and control, while improving com-
munications and both individual and collective understanding
of the attainment process. Experience and close observation
of the early iterations would provide a better base for refine-




VII. PROBLEMS AND ALTERNATIVES
This chapter will re-examine some previously identified
problems in war reserve planning and management as well as
introduce several new considerations. For presentation pur-
poses only, topics have been grouped as (1) technical prob-
lems, (2) problems associated with better use of war reserve
assets, (3) the use of commercially available products, (4)
industrial preparedness planning, and (5) implications of
current discussions regarding the future of the Marine Corps.
A. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
The foremost problem in this, if not all, areas of war
reserve management is item essentiality. This concept is
simultaneously elusive to measure and pervasive in its effect
on requirements determination and asset attainment. This
study has suggested a method for establishing comparative
essentiality among items based on the precedence of the
various missions assigned to a unit. Annual guidance develop-
ed by HQMC provides inter-contingency priorities which, al-
though a vital part of essentiality, are difficult to imple-
ment and of little value in assessing item-by-item tradeoffs.
LMI, in exploring the complete question of essentiality,
isolated three components: [10:40]
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(1) item essentiality - which items are most critical to
the success of a given mission,
(2) mission essentiality - which missions are most critical
to the success of overall unit operations,
(3) component force essentiality - which units/missions
are most critical to the success of overall force operations
Quantification of the several components of essentiality
complicates processing and further increases the dependence
of the procedure on subjective judgement.
LMI further suggests that requirements be related to
specific contingencies, i.e., reinforcement and defense of
the Danish islands against Soviet invasion instead of the
generally expressed ability to repel an enemy by fire and
close combat. As the Marine Corps does not currently have
such missions assigned, and as specific contingencies dictate
specific requirements, this change would add yet another
dimension to essentiality. Under constrained budget condi-
tions any system for prioritizing asset attainment would have
to be capable of dealing with the relative criticalities and
probabilities of competing world-wide contingencies.
Chapter III pointed out that item selection procedures
for war reserves are heavily judgmental, fragmented among
different organizations, and not fully coordinated with other
logistic and tactical considerations. An additional aspect
which is often neglected is the interchangeability and sub-
stitutability characteristics of individual items. In order
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to prevent the exaggeration of requirements, LMI suggests
that stockage objectives be computed for groups of related
items. Families so identified would be treated in the attain-
ment process such that those members designated most prefer-
red or widely adaptable would be funded first. The greatest
incidence and impact of such relationships is in repair parts,
Chapter V identified excessive reliance on judgment and
the increasing inapplicability of incomplete and aging histor-
ical data as problems in determining replacement factors.
Mandating a uniform calculation procedure, moving towards
sophisticated simulation, and capturing accurate data from
peacetime operations are all elements of a solution.
The final technical problem to be discussed deals with
the classification of war reserve materiel. Presently, with
the exception of a small amount of supplies managed by the
Navy, virtually all Marine Corps WRM is classed as pre-
positioned. This decision is based not only on the normal
considerations which dictate pre-positioning, but also on
the lack of a priority issue/attainment system at the inte-
grated manager level which would permit the Marine Corps to
rely more heavily on IMMs.
GAO comments illustrate increasing disfavor with the
apparent diseconomies in this situation: [17:28]
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... If the appropriate DOD integrated managers stored
war reserve materiel at their depots, space now used
for this purpose at Albany and Barstow would not be
needed. The Corps already obtains 39,940 of its
48/592 war reserve items (82 percent) from other inte-
grated managers; and these include 39,810 consumable
items such as nuts, bolts, and spark plugs, which
would require little storage space at other depots.
... We understand the Marine Corps preference for stor-
ing its war reserve and other materiel at Corps depots
instead of other DOD depots. However, this is a costly
preference.
The Marine Corps response to this criticism states:
[18:6]
The current method used by the Marine Corps for
managing and distributing Prepositioned War Reserve
Stocks is considered essential to provide rapid re-
sponse to changing situations/missions. Although
other integrated managers could hold Marine Corps PWRS
,
under current policies and procedures, they cannot
guarantee to provide all quantities, funded by the
Corps, when withdrawal is necessary. The recent Near-
Term Prepositioned Ships Program (NTPS) was accomplish-
ed by the Marine Corps mainly due to its ability to
control and direct the use of their PWR assets . .
.
If assets were held by various other integrated man-
agers, the coordination/control efforts alone would
have caused serious delays . . . The availability of
warehouse space is not the main concern when posi-
tioning supplies, especially PWRS. Rather the prime
concern is the capability for the expeditious with-
drawal of the supplies to satisfy demands in a
responsive manner. The Marine Corps has preposi-
tioned assets at Albany and Barstow sites, both of
which have close access to seaports via an extensive
rail and highway net, for rapid response to operat-
ing force requirements in the Atlantic and Pacific.
By consolidating its PWRS at these two depots, with-
drawal efforts can be readily directed . . . without
competing with services or priorities and without
disrupting their DOD activities.
Not mentioned are bitter memories of past experiences with
IMMs such as the Vietnam-era episode of Marines fighting with
M-14s while Air Force units drew upon limited stocks of the
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more advanced M-16 service rifle. While current Corps pro-
cedures may circumvent prescribed policy, they do so for very
good reason. The problem is not the Marine Corps action but
the situation which makes it necessary and the possibility
that GAO or others may force adherence to the letter of cur-
rent regulations without correcting inequities in IMM attain-
ment and issue.
B. BETTER USE OF WAR RESERVE ASSETS
The original impetus for this study came from war reserve
managers in Albany, Georgia interested in ways to better uti-
lize war reserve inventories. The very nature of WRM —
assets to be protected for use in emergency situations —
places considerable restrictions on just what can be done.
But in the development of this study several ideas have been
suggested. Many of these spring from the war reserve mission
of providing support for a limited period of time, namely the
D-day to P-day concept, while others are related to special
characteristics of war reserve inventories.
The first suggestion is that in-use assets be carefully
monitored and rotated into a war reserve status when opera-
tional and maintenance considerations clearly favor exchange
for an identical item held in war reserves. The logic here
is that war reserve items need be serviceable and ready-for-
issue, but not new. This argument takes on even greater
significance in the later years of an equipment life cycle.
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At that time maintenance and spare parts support are often
difficult, while procurement of new items of aging design is
unsound.
A similar proposal for improving support during the later
years of an equipment life cycle is to release war reserve
assets to active forces as they can be replaced by items of
the follow-on design. Presently the new items are procured
and held, often for extended periods, until complete allow-
ance quantities, spare parts and supporting publications are
on-hand. As delays more often than not accompany this com-
plicated attainment process, FMF users of the equipment to be
replaced find themselves with overaged items, shortages of
repair parts, and possibly a lack of operators and maintenance
personnel as staffing changes occur in accordance with the
original schedule for fielding the new equipment. Careful
and coordinated management and release of war reserve assets
might ameliorate some of these problems.
The above suggestions can be advanced because of the geo-
graphical proximity of war reserve stocks and the units in-
volved. Similarly, coordination of the war reserve effort
with other programs at logistic and operational bases can
reduce overall equipment investment and provide for exercis-




(1) Using war reserve assets at the logistics bases to
smooth-out production runs and avoid bottlenecks in the
depot rebuild program,
(2) Using war reserve assets for training purposes at
formal schools,
(3) Using war reserve assets for support of Marine Corps
Reserve units,
(4) Using war reserve assets for central equipment pools
such as that maintained by the Marine Corps Air-Ground
Combat Center (MCAGCC) , Twentynine Palms, California,
(5) Using war reserve assets to support the direct ex-
change programs of Operational Readiness Float and Main-
tenance Float accounts.
These suggestions are made because of the close relationship
between the readiness of active forces and the need for war
reserves. WRM and PFMR are complimentary parts of the V7ar
Materiel Requirement. Management ingenuity and initiative
can be exercised in the considerable gap which exists be-
tween asset postures of satisfactory and sacrosanct.
C. COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS
The federal government has stressed reliance on commer-
cial goods and services for many years. Such initiatives as
Office of Management and Budget (0MB) circular A-76 dealing
with the acquisition of commercial and industrial products
and services, and the Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program
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(CCAP) have forced government organizations to justify de-
partures from commercial reliance.
Commercial reliance as a procurement policy stresses the
potential for reductions in cost and lead time, increases in
the availability of items and parts, improved maintenance
and logistics support, and a strengthening of the defense
industrial base. Overshadowing all political and economic
considerations, however, is the inherent truth that there are
some very real differences between military and commercial
requirements. Unique mission and environmental considera-
tions must be identified and dealt with. Readiness is not
just a goal, but a matter of survival.
Often these differences are not interpreted as considera-
tions, but as constraints. A system which believes that any
jeep, radio, forklift, or electronic test set must be able to
be used in a combat environment anywhere in the world procures
suitable assets. Thus, as an example, every jeep has fording
and winterization capabilities which will probably never be
used, and which eliminate from consideration for procurement
commercial products which are less expensive to purchase,
operate and support, and which would prove entirely satisfac-
tory in most operating situations.
Related to this ultimate use paranoia is the common
practice of gold-plating requirements. This results in a
product specification which represents a summation of tech-
nological capability rather than the answer to a specific
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need. This practice makes the identification of a suitable
commercial product virtually impossible and leads to exor-
bitant development and procurement costs, as well as un-
necessarily complicated training and support.
Within DOD the forces of inertia and notions of poor
quality equipment which cannot be supported in a military
environment work against buy-commercial initiatives. Much
of this sentiment comes from Vietnam-era horror stories of
commercial substitutes which could not measure up. Such
feelings ignore the critical if not completely successful
role which commercial products played in plugging the gaps
created by long lead times for military products. Also dis-
counted is the fact that an effective buy-commercial program
would narrow the gap between defense and non-defense pro-
duction, and hopefully improve the availability of suitable
materiel during mobilization surge demand periods.
A full discussion of the merits and demerits of commer-
cial products is beyond the scope of this study. The point
to be made is that some of the major criticisms of commercial
products are less forceful when applied to war reserves in-
tended for use for a limited time. Equipment and support
options considered unacceptable for prolonged periods may be
satisfactory during the war reserve period if significantly
lower investment and holding costs hang in the balance.
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D. INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS PLANNING
Stockage of war reserves and the use of products which
are readily available in the commercial market are two ways
of dealing with the D-day to P-day gap. A third approach is
to reduce the gap itself through industrial preparedness
planning. Although such planning would primarily be accom-
plished by integrated managers, it remains a valid offset to
war reserve requirements as recognized by the WMPC.
In a GAO report in 1977 the Secretary of Defense was
quoted as follows: [19:1]
A viable industrial base is a major element of our
national strength and deterrent posture, and maintain-
ing the capacity of that industrial base to respond to
potential warfare demands continues to be a major con-
sideration in our defense planning. In some specific
areas, however, we have experienced a gradual erosion
of the defense industrial base. Material scarcities,
increases in production lead times, and the cost burden
to comply with safety, health, and environment protec-
tion requirements are symptoms of this erosion. In
addition, private industry is less willing to accept
the complexities of doing business with the Defense
Department as the proportion of defense spending in
the economy decreases.
This erosion is manifested in the changing number of defense
contractors and subcontractors, and in known, yet persistent,
shortages of critical commodities. [19:1]
DOD officials have expressed concern over the
diminishing number of subcontractors and the grow-
ing dependence on foreign sources for military parts
and components. Through recent attempts to quantify
the problem of a diminishing contractor base, DOD has
identified several military items for which there is
inadequate production capacity, including aircraft
engines, radar, landing gears, and navigation systems.
Shortages were also observed in tank hull castings,
gun mounts, and infrared systems.
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If these conditions exist during peacetime, the risk and
implications under an accelerated demand scenario are indeed
grim.
In its report to Congress, GAO characterized contractor
IPP input as insufficient, unreliable, and generally lacking
in detailed planning and analysis. [19:3] Input was plagued
with unrealistic assumptions, insufficient supporting data,
and a lack of planning for the lower tiers of the defense
industrial structure. Some contractors refuse to conduct
planning at all, dismissing it as an empty exercise without
a full consideration of vendors and subcontractors. More
commonly, however, contractors superficially blunder through
the process, erasing potential problems with grandiose assump-
tions and failing to arrive at comprehensive and feasible
solutions for those problems which are identified.
A major reason for the lack of contractor effort is the
voluntary nature of the program. Proper planning would re-
quire diverse and specialized talents, voluminous detailed
information, and a great deal of human and computer time.
The sum total of these factors is a weighty price tag, yet
DOD does not fund contractor efforts.
A second contributing factor to contractor indifference
is the program's lack of credibility. The token quantities
of resources committed to the effort by DOD certainly inspire
something other than confidence and respect in industrial
participants. Additionally, the lack of feedback and follow-
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on effort leads contractors to conclude that it is no more
than an empty exercise. The futility and frustration expe-
rienced by DOD planners themselves is illustrated by a state-
ment from an Air Force Logistics Center Office: [19:11]
. . . more than five IPP cycles have been completed
and several thousand items have been selected and sent
to industry and repair facilities for planning. To date,
no funds have been provided to purchase Industrial Pre-
paredness Measures . . . for one single item . . . Through-
out the period of involvement in Southeast Asia, these
measures were not implemented and it was possible to
satisfy Air Force requirements through a judicious pro-
cess of priorities and allocations. Based on past expe-
rience of this program, recommend this program be
eliminated.
The state of IPP has been reviewed to show that an area of
potential savings is currently an area of considerable un-
certainty. Poor planning which identifies erroneous problems
or gives false illusions of adequacy is worse than no plan-
ning at all.
In a final note, streamlined procurement procedures
aimed at reducing the administrative lead time involved in
defense procurement could also influence the war reserve
support period.
E. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
The final category of potential problems deals with the
future. The advent of the 1980s found Congress, the Marine
Corps itself, and other organizations examining future roles
for the Corps. Questions related to mission orientation,
and force size and distribution highlight the possibility of
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significant changes in the nature and size of equipment allow-
ances. Such changes could have an obvious impact on war re-
serve requirements and policies.
The impetus for this concern lies in recent international
developments, changing perceptions of the NATO/Warsaw Pact
balance, and the recurring theme that amphibious assaults
against defended beachheads are a military anachronism. The
question of the viability of an amphibious assault capability
challenges several unique characteristics of the Corps:
(1) Marine Corps Divisions are light, foot infantry,
short in armored ground mobility and firepower in compar-
ison to similar U.S. Army and foreign infantry units.
(2) Air Wings with massive firepower are operationally
integrated with the Divisions, which also enjoy greater
helicopter-borne mobility than their military counter-
parts.
(3) Slow moving ships and landing craft used in amphib-
ious assaults appear to be especially susceptible to
recent advances in weaponry such as precision guided
munitions.
In combination with changing roles, missions, and areas of
operation, the continuing lack of strategic mobility — espe-
cially sealift — further focuses attention on preposition-
ing options. In a recent report to Congress, the Congres-
sional Budget Office identified four alternative postures
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for the Marine Corps of the future. These options and their
implications are suitimarized in Figure 7-1.
The purpose of this section in this study is not to
suggest alternatives, but to point out that discussions with
far-reaching consequences for war reserves are taking place.
Internally designed and controlled reform and transition
are undoubtedly preferable to the less well-informed dictates
of external offices and agencies.
War reserve-related problems cover a multitude of areas
indeed. Solutions to these problems require imagination,
coordination, and above all, concentrated attention. General
and specific recommendations will be offered in Chapter VIII.
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COMPARISON OF MARINE CORPS BUDGET OPTIONS
OPTION MISSION ORIENTATION FORCE DISTRIBUTION
I. Maintain current 3 Divisions
general purpose/ 1 afloat brigade (battalions
amphibious role in Mediterranean Sea,
Pacific and Indian Oceans)
3 brigades for RDF
5 brigades for SACEUR reserve)
1 plus MAF sealift
3 Air Wings
II. Prestocking for a 3 Divisions
Europe-oriented 2/3 afloat brigade (battal-
Marine Corps; ions in Mediterranean Sea
limited amphibious and Indian Ocean)
role against 4 brigades for Denmark
opposition 1 brigade for Nor^vay
1/3 brigade for Iceland
1 brigade for Asia/RDF
2 brigades for SACEUR reserve
2/3 MAF sealift
3 Air Wings
III. Prestocking in 3 Divisions
Indian Ocean; 1-2/3 afloat brigades
amphibious lift (3 MAUs in Indian Ocean;
for quick-strike 1 MAU in Mediterranean Sea;
Marine force battalion in Pacific Ocean
3 brigades for RDF
4-1/3 brigades for general
purpose
1-2/3 MAF sealift
3 Air Wings (less 3 fighter/
attack squadrons)
IV. Prestocking 3 Divisions
for flexible 1 afloat brigade (as in #1)
Marine operations 3 brigades for RDF
in northern 2 brigades for northern
Europe and the Europe
Indian Ocean 3 brigades for general
purpose
1 plus MAF sealift






COMPARISON OF MARINE CORPS BUDGET OPTIONS
OPTION NATURE OF FORCES KEY BUDGET DECISIONS
I. Light infantry with Procure: Equipment for RDF
sufficient equipment LSD-41
to support three armored MPS (1)
brigades; primary fire RORO ("2)
support from aircraft; F/A-18
amphibious ships for Develop: LCAC
major opposed landings CX
Milcon: Diego Garcia,
Kenya , Oman , and
Somalia
Cancel: AV-8B
II. Heavy brigades in Procure: F/A-18
Jutland; light forces Equipment for RDF
elsewhere; prestocking MPS (1)
for forces in Norway, RORO (2)
Denmark; aircraft Develop: CX
primary fire support Milcon: Diego Garcia,






III. Light armored infantry Procure: MPS (1)
with major amphibious RORO (2)
orientation; prestocking Equipment for RDF
for forces in the Indian Light armored
Ocean; reduced airborne vehicles






Cancel: CX; USMC A- 18
IV. Light armored infantry; Procure: MPS (1)
mixed amphibious and RORO (2)
land orientation; Equipment for RDF
reduced airborne 2 brigades on MPS
fighter/attack support in Great Britain
Develop: CX; LCAC; AV-8B
Light armored
vehicles
Milcon: Diego Garcia and
Great Britain




VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The contents of this study can best be suiranarized by
returning to the major questions which defined the thesis
intent.
To maximize the benefits derived from war reserve dollars,
a system of establishing comparative essentiality between
items, missions, forces, and contingencies is needed. Such
a system, based on the missions normally assigned to a given
type of unit, has been suggested. Central to implementing
this scheme and establishing spending priorities is the recog-
nition that some items involve management considerations which
defy computerized decision-making. The concept of a skeleton
T/E has been introduced as a basic block of material without
which a unit cannot perform those minimum essential mission-
related tasks. This block, if accurately identified, is
useful in identifying problems and deficiencies, and coping
with budget, lift, storage and other constraints.
Increasing the utilization of war reserve materiel first
requires abandoning the philosophy that protection of these
assets means forbidding their use. Suggestions herein in-
clude rotating used but serviceable items into war reserves,
accomplishing attainment of newly procured items in war re-
serves while simultaneously releasing predecessor items to
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the field/ and supporting a variety of programs and organiza-
tions with war reserve assets. The ultimate goal of these
actions is to change war reserves from a materiel militia
awaiting the call to arms into a truly active inventory.
Alternatives to war reserve stockage such as industrial
preparedness planning and the use of acceptable commercial
products remain largely unexplored, but certainly have some
potential to reduce total war reserve requirements.
The types of solutions needed go beyond more efficient
management to new and different ways of doing business, and
rethinking the self-imposed concepts and constraints of the
past.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of constraints surrounding the research effort
and the thesis intent itself, the conclusions and recommenda-
tions are general in nature. Suspicions and suggestions are
offered in place of confirmed facts or final solutions in
some cases.
Based on the research described in this study, the follow-
ing conclusions were reached:
(1) War reserve policy suffers from inconsistent applica-
tion and a misunderstanding of the complete process, espe-




(2) While responsibility may, of necessity, be divided
between offices and organizations, coordination and an
understanding of necessary interactions cannot be sacrificed
(3) Current procedures rely too heavily on judgment and
special experience which are subjective and breed in-
consistency.
(4) Proposed changes and systems are easily evaluated in
light of obvious shortcomings while the potential for im-
provement is overlooked.
(5) War reserve needs are dynamic and must be frequently
and methodically reviewed.
(6) Logistics factors such as lift capacity and main-.^n-
tenance capability are frequently ignored when stockage
decisions are made.
(7) Possible alternatives to war reserve stockage are
not being effectively explored.
(8) The full potential for use of physical assets in the
war reserve inventory is not being realized.
Relative to these conclusions, recommendations include:
(1) That the war reserve process be automated to a much
greater degree. Considerable attention must be devoted
to program logic and the identification of classes of




(2) That the war reserve system must be periodically
exercised, questioned, reviewed and adjusted in light of
performance and changing requirements.
(3) That a system to better measure comparative essen-
tiality be designed and implemented.
(4) That war reserve information systems be modified to
reflect multiple criticalities for different uses of an
item, or an aggregate figure which is more representative
than the most critical use.
(5) That the concept of skeleton T/Es be explored as a
vital building block and tool for coping in real time
with a wide variety of constraints, and for identifying
shortages and problems requiring immediate attention.
(6) That those items/classes of materiel which are most
likely to have suitable commercial substitutes be identi-
fied. Following certification of their suitability,
options such as increased contractor support or contractor
stockage of contingency inventories could be considered.
(7) That Defense Property Disposal Office excess lists
be screened for items which could fill a gap in war
reserves.
(8) That ideas for additional uses of war reserve assets
be solicited from within the Marine Corps.
(9) That priorities for asset attainment be linked to
withdrawal procedures to ensure that materiel is dis-
tributed to fill the highest priority need.
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(10) That the ideas and suggestions addressed in this
study be further investigated.
Automation, forecasting requirements, quantifying essen-
tiality and similar improvements involve significant technical
and theoretical problems. Progress should not be held back
by looking for the ultimate answer. Incremental improvements
which are simple, soundly conceived, well understood and con-
sistently applied will point in the right direction.
Finally, optimum war reserve performance and utilization,
much like supply economy, is more a philosophy than a proce-
dure. It cannot be a singular responsibility. While war
reserve managers may function as policemen. Marines, both
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